We use data from 298 showings of the television program "Affari Tuoi," which involves contestants making decisions between risky prospects with possible prizes of up to half a million euros, to estimate three models of decision-making under risk: Expected Utility, Rank-Dependent Expected Utility and Regret-Rejoice. We find that Regret-Rejoice does not significantly improve upon Expected Utility, while Rank-Dependent outperforms it. Interestingly, we find that the CARA specification fits significantly better than the conventionally-adopted CRRA specification. Crucially, we find a significant role for unobserved heterogeneity, implying that our estimates provide more superior estimates of risk attitude and of probability weighting than other studies.
Introduction
Despite intensive research activity, there is still no clear consensus on modelling the behavior of individuals making choices under risk, although experiments, both laboratory and natural, have greatly contributed to the understanding of how individuals make risky decisions. Television shows provide a good natural context in which contestants face well-defined decision problems in a ceteris paribus environment and in which contestants have the benefit of salient incentives 1 allowing studies using such data to overcome both the Harrison and List (2004) and the Rabin (2000) critiques concerning the inferential validity of estimates based on a typical economic experiment, i.e., based on a non-representative sample and limited incentives provided by small money stakes.
We use data from the TV program "Affari tuoi" 2 to contribute to the understanding of modelling decision making under risk. The characteristics of the game, in that it involves lotteries composed of both small and very large prizes, allow us to investigate the performance of the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RD) and Regret-Rejoice (RR) utility functionals 3 in addition to the standard Expected Utility (EU) functional. Our research is designed to capture nuances in contestants' behavior neglected by the EU formulation. Specifically, with the introduction of an RD functional, we can take into account the fact that some contestants appear to overvalue the extreme prizes of a lottery relative to the others; while the RR functional allows us to consider regret or rejoice considerations of contestants when confronted with situations that could radically change their wealth.
We use data from 298 showings in order to fit the three different models of decision-making under risk. 4 As the show is comprised of many rounds, each contestant is observed several times. Therefore, our data set has a panel structure, so we try to find the preference functional that fits the data best by analyzing the data collected on observing contestants' choices in different showings altogether. Because different participants in the game differ in crucial characteristics, we control for between-individual heterogeneity by introducing heterogeneity terms both in the form of observable and unobservable individual factors. The former includes everything concerning the contestant that can be observed, like their gender or geographic origin, following Harrison and Rutström (2005) ; the latter involves all individual characteristics that cannot be observed, such as optimism or pessimism, 1 A flourishing literature exists analyzing individual risk attitudes through TV games (Friend and Blume, 1975; Gertner, 1993; Metrick, 1995; Beetma and Shotman, 2001) . 2 "Affari tuoi" is the Italian version of the Endemol international Deal or No Deal. 3 Loomes and Sugden (1982) ; Quiggin (1982) . 4 Blvatskyy and Pogrebna (2007a,b) and Bombardini and Trebbi (2007) make different analyses of the Italian dataset. cultural background, etc., as suggested by Conte et al. (2007) . We then estimate a random coefficient structural probit model, solving the technical difficulties encountered in the estimation process by using simulation techniques.
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Our work is different from other works using similar datasets in that our estimation technique allows estimation of the joint distribution over the population of the relevant parameters in the chosen preference functionals. We also test the validity of Regret-Rejoice theory. We finally highlight in statistical terms the issue of the identification of choice models nesting the EU preference functional.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the basic rules of the TV show; Section 3 details the econometric models to be estimated; Section 4 presents the empirical results; Section 5 gives some examples to explain EU, RD and RR at work in explaining contestants' choices and proposes some statistical foundations for the identification of RD and RR behaviors; Section 6 concludes.
The game and the sample
"Affari Tuoi" is a 5-step stop-and-go game between a contestant and a banker. The game starts with 20 contestants, one from each of the 20 Italian regions. At the beginning of each game a notary randomly assigns 20 sealed boxes, each containing one of the prizes (expressed in Euros) listed in Table 1 Only one contestant at a time is selected to actually play the game by means of a general-knowledge question; 7 the fastest candidate who answers correctly plays the game. Since the questions usually imply no particular background or skills, we will assume in our analysis that contestants are randomly selected, though with a presumption of self-selection of the original 20 contestants of individuals keen to appear on TV.
The selected contestant starts the game against the banker with the box she is assigned at the beginning of the showing. In each of the subsequent rounds, the selected contestant opens a fixed number of the boxes owned by the other contestants, who are no longer participating in the current game, 6 boxes in the first round and 3 in each of the following until the last round, losing the possibility of winning the prizes contained therein. Between every two rounds, the banker makes an offer: he either offers the contestant the opportunity to exchange her box for any of the remaining ones, referred to as a "swap", or offers a certain amount of money to the contestant to quit the game. If the contestant accepts the money, the game ends, otherwise she proceeds to the next round. If the contestant gets to the final round without having accepted any of the banker's offers, she wins the content of the box owned at that stage. We concentrate solely on the instances when the banker makes a monetary offer and we study the contestants' responses. 8 We consider these answers as 7 The contestant selected to play in the game will be replaced by another from the same region in the subsequent showing. 8 Thus we do not analyze the behavior of contestants when given the opportunity to exchange their box for one of the other remaining ones, for the simple reason that all the preference functionals considered in this paper would predict that the contestant should be indifferent to exchanging or choices between a lottery (over the contents of the remaining unopened boxes) and the amount of money offered to them by the banker. Our sample is composed of 298 episodes, 9 of which exactly one-half were men and one-half were women. The contestants are less evenly divided on geographical origin basis. In our sample we record 115 contestants from the North of Italy (39% of the whole sample, 62 men and 53 women), 75 from the Center (25%, 36 and 39), and 108 from the South (36%, 51 and 57). All regions are represented, ranging from 7 contestants from Calabria to 22 from Veneto. Table 2 reports some summary statistics of the main characteristics of the sample.
As Andersen et al. (2008) notice, three main estimation strategies have been developed to test hypotheses on behavior under risk within Deal or No Deal. We briefly discuss them here.
The simplest method is to develop qualitative indicators which usually lead to scarce but definitive conclusions: for example, by comparing the money offer with the expected value of the two remaining prizes at the last round, riskloving, indifference to risk, or risk-aversion can be easily inferred. Many authors make this kind of analysis as a preliminary step to more structured estimations, and Blvatskyy and Pogrebna (2007a,b) use qualitative indicators to test formally alternative hypotheses about contestants' risk attitude. Such an analysis allows individual-specific estimates, but its applicability is limited to a small set of research questions.
Alternatively, a bound approach à la Holt and Laury (2002) is used. It is meant to provide upper and lower bounds for the risk attitude parameter according to contestants' behavior during the game. The typical application assumes expected utility behavior (EU), with CARA or CRRA preference functionals, implying that the highest offer rejected sets a maximum value for individual's risk aversion, while the offer possibly accepted sets a minimum value. The main advantage of this technique is that it also allows for individual-specific estimates, at the cost of providing only intervals of values, frequently not closed (for individuals who never accept the banker's offers) and possibly empty (for individuals whose behavior is not consistent with the simple choice model adopted). Deck et al. (2008) follow this approach. Bombardini and Trebbi (2007) combine this analysis with an interval regression of the estimated bounds, in order to investigate the role of possible sources of observed heterogeneity among contestants. Others like Post et al. (2007) and Mulino et al. (2006) employ this method as a preliminary data analysis.
not. Blvatskyy and Pogrebna (2007a,b) consider choices over the swap, on a subset of the Italian database. 9 We wish to thank Claudia Rosati and Silvana and Maria Conte for their help in collecting the data.
Finally, it is possible to define a latent structural decision process and estimate a logit or probit model as a function of the model's parameters. This is the approach we follow, in line with Andersen et al. (2006 Andersen et al. ( , 2008 , de Roos and Sarafidis (2006), Mulino et al. (2006) and Post et al. (2007) .
We represent contestants' decisions as a choice between the banker's offer and a lottery, which consists of the possibility of winning any of the remaining prizes with equal probability. In other words, we assume that contestants behave myopically, in that they consider the possibility of winning one of the remaining prizes in a subsequent round of the game, but they neglect the banker's future offers. It is worth noting that no clear consensus has been reached thus far about the validity of alternative hypotheses on contestants' myopia or on different degrees of forward-looking behavior in the game. Several attempts have been made employing bound approaches, but these do not allow for a formal comparison of estimates, e.g., through some measures of goodness-of-fit. de Roos and Sarafidis (2006) propose the only attempt to fit a structural model of both dynamic and static behaviors, using a database from the Australian edition of Deal or No Deal. Unfortunately, their estimates are based on samples of different length, and therefore likelihoods of the two models are non-comparable.
The choice models
We assume that, during the game, contestants are confronted with a sequence of binary choices between a lottery, where they can win one of the remaining boxes, each obviously with equal probability, and a degenerate lottery where they can win with probability 1, the amount of money offered by the banker.
The game consists of 5 rounds, which we denote by 5 , , 1 L = n . We consider three different preference functionals: Expected Utility, Rank-Dependent Expected Utility and Regret-Rejoice. We assume that contestant i's utility function either takes the form of a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) function, given by
or by a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) function, defined by
where x is the lottery outcome and ( ) 000 , 500 max = x (all the lottery outcomes are divided by 1000), and r i is a risk attitude parameter. Here, both the utility functionals are appropriately normalized such that ( ) 0
. As noted before, we estimate contestants' preferences alternatively assuming EU, RD and RR preferences. We start with EU. Specifically, let EU in be the expected utility of the equi-probable prize lottery in round n for contestant i, that is, the probability-weighted utility of each outcome left in round n,
where n p is the empirical probability of each of the lottery prizes the contestant faces in round n, and 
If, instead, the individual's preference functional is RD, then we define RD in to be the RD of the lottery in round n for contestant i,
where the prizes n k x are sorted in a decreasing order. Equation (5) 
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Here, g i is the RD parameter. Thus, if g i = 1, RD reduces to EU. Figure 3 in the appendix reports the cumulative weighting functions for RD preferences (w i (p)) and the distributions of weights across prizes in decreasing order at each round ( n ik π ). When g i < 1, the two extreme prizes (the highest and the lowest) are overvalued with respect to the central, and this attitude increases as g i goes to zero. Moreover, the lowest prize gets a higher weight with respect to the highest, even if this relative distance reduces as g i goes to 1. When g i > 1, the order of importance of the prizes is reversed (prizes at the center of the spectrum are given more weight than those at the upper and lower ends), even if the lowest prize is still over-valued relative to the highest at all rounds. If contestant i exhibits RD preferences, she chooses the option of playing the lottery (or the option of accepting the amount offered), if and only if
Suppose now individual i behaves according to RR. Let us denote RR in as the RR utility of the lottery in round n for contestant i, relative to the offer off in ,
where a i is the RR parameter and ( ) . sign and ( ) . abs , respectively, indicate the sign and the absolute value of the difference in parentheses. Thus, if a i = 1, RR also reduces to EU. If a i < 1 small differences between lottery outcomes and the banker's offer are relatively more relevant in the computation of the RR utility of the lottery than large differences; if a i > 1 small differences between lottery outcomes and the banker's offer are relatively less relevant than large differences. This can be observed in Figure 4 in the appendix where we report the shape of the component
If contestant i exhibits RR preferences, she chooses the option of playing the lottery or the option of accepting the amount offered, if and only if
To deal with the fact that contestants commit computational mistakes in calculating utilities, we add a Fechner-type error term (Hey and Orme, 1994) 
Whatever the preference functional is, define the variable y in = 1 if contestant i in round n chooses the lottery, and y in = -1 if contestant i in round n chooses the offer. We can then write contestant i's likelihood contribution for the choice she faces in round n as:
Here contestant i exhibits EU preferences. If contestant i behaves according to RD or RR, this likelihood contribution becomes, respectively:
We also introduce an error term, ω , referred to as "tremble" (Moffatt and Peters, 2001 ). This represents the probability that a contestant loses concentration and consequently makes a suboptimal choice: ω is zero if contestants behave optimally; it is 1 if their choices are completely random. The tremble is meant to capture noisiness in contestant choices not included in the Fechnerian error. With this new element, (14), (15) and (16) become, respectively:
As stated in the introduction, we deal with contestants' choices in a way that takes into account their heterogeneity. In other words, we want our models to be sufficiently flexible to explain contestants' differences in terms of the parameters characterizing the preference functionals. With this in mind, we assume that the risk attitude, RD and RR parameters vary according to observed and unobserved individual characteristics in the following way. Let the risk attitude parameter be 
The density function of the risk attitude parameter r i is ( ) r f . When the preference functional is RD, we also allow the RD parameter to be a function of demographic variables (z i ) and unobserved heterogeneity (u i rd ):
In addition, let ( )
be the joint density function of the risk attitude and the RD parameters: 
Here, rd r, ρ is the correlation coefficient between the risk attitude and the RD coefficient. A similar assumption holds for the RR specification. In effect, we assume that the RR parameter is a function of a constant ( 
Here, rr r, ρ is the correlation coefficient between i r and i a . Given these distributional assumptions, as in a standard random-effects probit model, we can integrate over the distribution or joint distribution of the parameters to obtain a tractable individual likelihood contribution. Let i N be the round at which contestant i leaves the game. Hence, in the EU case, contestant i's likelihood contribution is:
If contestant i is an RD expected utility maximizer, her likelihood contribution is:
Finally, in the case of RR preferences, it becomes:
In all the three cases the sample log-likelihood is:
Main econometric results
The three random coefficient models presented in the previous paragraph are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood. Our sample consists of 298 contestants, observed 3.1 times on average. The distribution of r i and the joint distributions (r i , g i ) and (r i , a i ) are simulated using 125 draws for each contestant based on Halton sequences (Train, 2003) . 11 The estimates of the three models with CARA and CRRA specification, without demographic variables, are reported respectively in Tables 3 and 4 . Robust standard errors in parentheses 11 We prefer maximum simulated likelihood technique to the more popular Gauss-Hermite quadrature, because the double integral in the RD and RR specifications raises many-fold the computational time of estimation.
In both tables, the mean of the risk attitude parameter ( r γ in all the specifications) is significantly bigger than 0, showing that the average contestant is risk averse. The mean of the RD parameter (γ rd ) is significantly smaller than 1; this implies that the average contestant overvalues the extreme outcomes relative to intermediate outcomes. The mean of the RR parameter (γ rr ) is not significantly different from 1; this suggests that the average contestant is not affected by regretrejoice behavior.
All the tremble parameters are statistically significant, though bigger under the CRRA specification than with a CARA utility functional, respectively close to 16% and close to 4%. This means that 16% of choices in the CRRA specification and 4% of choices in the CARA specification are taken at random.
Our analysis is not limited to an assessment of the average contestant behavior, but allows the observation of nuances in contestant behavior through the introduction of individual heterogeneity in the models. The presence of heterogeneity in the population is proven by the standard deviation of the random parameters in the preference functionals (σ r , σ rd , and σ rr ) all significantly different from zero. The introduction of unobserved heterogeneity terms always improves the fit over the representative agent specifications of the choice models, 12 models which do not take into account such differences in contestants' behavior. This can be clearly seen by comparing the estimates, and in particular the log-likelihoods, in Tables 3 and 4 with those in Tables 8 and 9 in the appendix (cross-tables comparisons by likelihood-ratio tests are reported in Table 11 in the appendix). We notice that there is a substantial variety of preferences in the population, as shown by the large magnitude of the estimated standard deviations of u i r , u i rd , and u i rr relative to the constant part (respectively, γ r , γ rd and γ rr ). Moreover, there is an evidence of a correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity terms in both the RD and the RR models, since are statistically significant, respectively positive, and negative in sign. This result allows us to identify a systematic relationship among risk attitude, and RD and RR behaviors in the population. In effect, a positive correlation in the RD model shows that the more risk averse a contestant is, the bigger the RD parameter, and vice versa. This suggests that there is a tendency for the most risk-loving contestants to overvalue the extreme prizes of the lottery they are playing with respect to the central; while the most risk averse tend to flatten their prizes' weight distribution. A negative correlation shown by the random parameters of the model characterizes the population of contestants assumed to behave according to RR. This implies that the more a contestant is risk averse the more the regret-rejoice parameter tends to be large, with the consequences explained in the previous section. In contrast, the most riskloving contestants tend to have a small regret-rejoice parameter. In all our estimates, the CARA specification fits better than the CRRA specification independently of the preference functional, as the likelihood-ratio tests in Table 11 in the appendix and the BIC tests in Tables 3 and 4 , and 8 and 9 in the appendix also show. This result is relevant since the majority of the experimental literature generally indicates that the CRRA specification fits better than the CARA. In unreported analysis, we also estimate the CRRA specification of the three models, assuming a non-zero life-time wealth as a parameter to be estimated, similarly to Andersen et al. (2006 Andersen et al. ( , 2008 . We find that the long-life wealth parameter is significantly different from zero and close to 20,000€. Nevertheless, the use of these specifications never improves the fit of our data over the CARA.
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Regardless of the utility functional used, among the competing choice models considered, the RD model always seems to fit the data best. In fact, the comparison of the log-likelihood of the EU and RD specification (see Table 11 in the appendix) confirms this result. On the other hand, the comparison EU versus RR by the likelihood-ratio test shows that the latter never improves the fit over the former. When RD and RR are jointly analyzed, BIC tests (reported at the bottom of each estimate) highlight again the superiority of the RD estimates. Hence, we can argue that the RD model provides a better account of contestants' choice than the RR model, although the latter is not completely discarded as the heterogeneity term highlights that some contestants actually exhibit regret-rejoice behavior.
Demographics and framing effects
To introduce observed heterogeneity, we include in our estimation a dummy gender and two geographical dummies (dummy north and dummy south). Demographics are introduced to calculate the mean of risk aversion and RD parameters for cohorts of contestants grouped on a gender and geographical basis.
14 This way, we are implicitly assuming that there are groups of contestants in the population, identified by their demographic characteristics, having different mean risk attitude, RD and RR parameters, even though each group has the same variance. Also an end-of-period dummy has been introduced (5 th round dummy), which we interpret as a framing effect generated in early rounds when contestants face not a one-shot lottery, but a sequence of nested lotteries. EU and RD estimates including demographics and the 5 th round dummy are reported in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. In the EU model, specifications 2 and 3 listed in Table 5 , contestants' gender does not significantly affect their risk aversion.
15 By contrast, the significance of the parameter on the dummy north reveals that contestants from the Center and South of Italy are relatively less risk averse than the others. Indeed, the fit significantly improves over the estimate in Table 3 (EU) only when the 5 th round dummy is introduced, according to the likelihood-ratio tests. The statistical significance of this framing effect suggests that contestants are much more risk averse when confronted with a one-shot lottery, even though in those cases the tremble's magnitude increases. 13 These results are available from the authors upon request. 14 In this subsection, following the results in the first part of the section, we will only focus on EU and RD models with a CARA utility functional. 15 See Schubert et al. (1999) . With RD preferences, the parameters on the 5 th round dummy, both affecting contestants' risk and RD attitudes, are never significant (Table 6 , specifications 1 and 3) in that they never improve the fit. By contrast, the introduction of demographics definitely improves the fit of the model, according to the likelihood-ratio test (Table 11 in the appendix). In the RD model with demographics (Table 6 , specifications 2 and 3), we observe that the mean risk attitude for contestants from the North and from the South of Italy is slightly larger than that of the others and that gender does not influence their risk attitude. Moreover, according to the Wald tests, the mean of the RD parameter for contestants from the South and North of Italy is slightly significantly smaller than 1, regardless of gender. Indeed, the sum of the coefficients on γ rd , gender rd and alternatively on dummy north rd and dummy south rd is significantly smaller than 1, with a value close to 0.54, that is smaller than the mean RD parameter estimated without demographics in Table 4 (that is significantly smaller than 1 and close to 0.76). Table 10 in the appendix reports Wald tests for such hypotheses. 
Competing models
The following examples highlight the previous results and describe the choice models we use in more detail, focusing in particular on what type of choices are better rationalized by the RD and RR models relative to the EU model. With this in mind, we present two numerical examples based on real situations experienced in the 4 th round by two contestants (contestant A and contestant B, both female) from our dataset. To parameterize the preference functionals we use the regression results in Table 3 . We assume that the parameters of the preference functionals correspond to the average contestant. In other words, we assume that risk attitude, RD and RR parameters, equal the mean of the distribution. The utility function is CARA, as according to the normalization in (1).
In the first example, contestant A faces the 5 equi-probable prize lottery
and is asked to choose between such a gamble and the banker's offer of 20,000€ (about 40% of the expected value of the lottery). In this lottery the second biggest prize is at stake, the other 4 prizes being comparatively very small, and in particular much smaller than the expected value of the lottery (about 50,000€). We want to solve contestant A's decision problem, assuming her to be alternatively EU, RD and RR, and to compare these predictions to the actual choice. In the reality, our contestant chooses the lottery instead of the money offer. We want to test the relative prediction of these functionals. Suppose contestant A behaves according to EU. In order to solve her decision problem we need to compare the expected utility of the lottery and the utility of the offer: she chooses the lottery over the offer (offer over the lottery) whenever
More explicitly, , the EU preference assumption wrongly suggests that contestant A prefers to stop the game with 20,000€. In effect, the four smallest prizes negatively contribute to the computation of ( ) ( ) 4 4 off U X EU − , and, even if the largest prize (250,000€) is very big, its solely positive contribution is not high enough to overcome the four negative smallest prizes' contribution. In such a situation, we could only explain contestant A's "no deal" choice through the Fechner error or the tremble.
Suppose now that contestant A is RDEU. This means that she attributes psychological weights, different from the empirical probabilities, to the prizes in the lottery according to the function Specifically, we can observe how she overvalues the smallest and the largest prizes with respect to the empirical probabilities, n p , and undervalues the central prizes. Under this assumption, to solve contestant A's decision problem we have to compute the difference between the RD expected value of the lottery and the utility of the offer: 
It is worth noting that the weight on the largest prize makes its contribution overcome the negative contribution of the other four prizes and even of the smallest one, which is the prize with the highest weight. Interestingly, even if contestant A has only 20% probability of winning 250,000€ and the offer is relatively small (40%) with respect to the expected value of the lottery, the EU functional incorrectly predicts that contestant i accepts the offer and the RD functional correctly predicts that contestant A refuses the offer and keeps on going with the game. Finally, suppose that contestant A is RR, such that to make her choice between the lottery and the amount of money she needs to compute the modified expected utility function abs . , contributes to let the contestant lean towards choosing the lottery. The relative importance of such a regret behavior depends on i a being bigger or smaller than 1. In fact, as explained in Section 3 and according to Figure 4 , when 1 > a small differences between the utility of the lottery outcome and the banker's offer account relatively less than big differences; when 1 < a , small differences are relatively more important than big differences. On the contrary, when off is a more desirable consequence than consequently RR correctly predicts that contestant A will choose the lottery. In effect, the regret component associated with the possibility of loosing 250,000€ is so high with respect to the four rejoice components of the formula, that it predicts that the contestant will choose the lottery, even if the probability of winning more than the offered amount is just 1/5. Contestant B experiences a substantially different situation. She faces a choice dilemma between the lottery and a banker's offer amounting to 70,000€. This case is different from the preceding one in that 3 out 5 lottery prizes exceed the banker's offer. In effect, not surprisingly, the EU preference functional predicts a "no deal" decision: 
It is interesting to observe how these functionals work at the counterintuitive prediction of the contestant B's choice. In effect, even if three out of the five prizes overcome the offer (two of which are a very large amount), she deals and leaves with 70,000€. In the RD case, it is the weight on the smallest prize that contributes strongly to the decision, while in the RR case it is the rejoice component associated with the possibility of getting 70,000€ instead of 500 and 15,000 which is relevant. Again, in this case EU fails in predicting the contestant's choice, and again predictions made according to RD and RR succeed. In the two preceding examples, we can observe different lottery compositions at work, psychological weights and regret-rejoice behaviors while contributing to the determination of contestants' choices in comparison with the classical EU maximizing behaviors. The expected utility of a lottery is a mixture of probabilities and utilities, and the mechanism enabling RD and RR to differ from EU is then the following: RD affects probabilities, keeping the utilities of the lottery outcomes invariant; RR modifies utilities, leaving the empirical probabilities of the outcomes unaffected. The argument that explains the reasons RD fits our data better than RR is subtle. If contestants, in making their choices, are used to overvalue or undervalue the extreme prizes of the lottery, they do it regardless of the composition of the lottery. Whether this contains only the smallest prizes or the highest prizes at stake in the game, nevertheless they will choose between the lottery and the offer overvaluing or undervaluing the extreme prizes of such a lottery. The RR gains superiority over the EU only when the difference between the utility of some of the prizes in the lottery and the utility of the offer is huge (whatever the sign of this difference). This often happens when the highest prizes are present in the current lottery. In our data set, it is quite likely that the highest prizes of the lottery are discarded from the game in early rounds, such that the composition of the lottery played in the subsequent rounds does not give a relevant contribution to letting the RR behavior emerge over the EU behavior. However, we have to point out that, within the framework of Affari Tuoi, in certain circumstances RR preferences are not distinguishable from expected utility. This is the case in the 5 th round, when contestants face choices between an amount of money and a lottery with only two prizes. 16 These two arguments together seem to cast light on the reason RR does not stand over the EU and the reason it is overcome by RD when asked to explain Affari tuoi contestants' choices.
Some statistical issues on the identification of the RD and RR behaviors
In the preceding section, by means of two numerical examples, we observed how the peculiar characteristics of the RD and the RR functionals work at explaining contestants' choices. Actually, the difference between the EU and, alternatively, the RD and the RR functional is just a matter of a parameter: the g parameter in the RD case; the a parameter for the RR. Because, in both cases, when that parameter equals 1, RD and RR reduce to EU. This is the statistical relevance of the identification of the RD and RR behavioral models.
Here we want to give some statistical foundations to this issue. With this in mind, we constructed the power function for the following hypothesis tests: Each sample had the same dimension and was confronted with the same decision problems of the sample of Affari Tuoi contestants we use in this study. Both the power functions are bell shaped, but asymmetric. In particular, deviations from H 0 : g = 1 in the direction of g > 1 appear easier to detect than g < 1. For a, deviations in the direction of a < 1 appear easier to detect. In the RD case, the power function is slightly over-sized, because the minimum of the function in Figure 1 is slightly above the horizontal line that corresponds to a 5% rejection power. In any case, this appears to have good power, especially when 1 > g . The power function for the RR model is also slightly over-sized, but the minimum now is just above the 5% line in Figure 2 . It appears to be not powerful in the close neighborhood of 1, but powerful further away, especially when 1 < a .
Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to compare the predictive power of three alternative models of decision making under risk: Expected Utility (EU) theory, RankDependent Expected Utility (RD) and Regret-Rejoice (RR), using a sample of repeated individual choices collected from a popular TV show.
The choice of such a particular sample stems from considerations about the distribution of very high prizes involved. These prizes constitute a strong incentive for contestants to reveal their true preferences, an incentive which may not be present in laboratory experiments. Furthermore, it allows us to analyze behavior of a more heterogeneous sample of the Italian population, as compared to traditional laboratory samples, even though we have no pretension of representativeness.
The analysis has been conducted by means of a particular estimation technique that consists in estimating the joint distribution of the relevant parameters of preference functionals over the population and to observe how the mean of such a distribution varies according to demographic characteristics of contestants (gender and geographical region).
A second achievement of this work is the estimation of a regret-rejoice preference functional, which to our knowledge has never been done before, in a random-coefficient structural model as that employed here. The intuitions behind the three theories considered, and the respective implications for predicting choice behavior, are discussed by means of simple examples, based on real data taken from our sample. Finally, this study focuses on identification aspects of the estimation of the Rank Dependent and Regret-Rejoice preference functionals. These both nest the EU functional and are able to account for non-EU choices only if the relevant parameter is correctly identified. In applying the analysis to our data this happens in the case of RD preferences, but not in the case of RR preferences. Our results imply that in the described framing, where contestants' choices involve both small and large prizes, the RD behavioral model fits significantly better the data than both EU and RR, while RR does not improve upon EU in explaining contestants' choices. χ ) 0.0000 Table 6 (1) v/s 
Appendix

